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Depending on the kind of literature networks in general, and Chinese networks in 
particular seem to be different phenomena, or are explained by different factors leaving 
the interested public puzzled. Whether Chinese networks resemble Clans, Clubs, or 
Mafia-kind of organizations is as much disputed as the effects of networking on the 
economy. While some argue that networks contribute to overall factor productivity in a 
situation in which neither the old planning system nor the nascent markets function 
(Krug/Polos 2003, Qian), others insist (Cheung, Shleifer) on their counterproductive 
potential for the transformation of the Chinese economy. A third group dismisses 
networks as a transitory phenomena that will disappear with ongoing market reforms, in 
particular the wider use of the price mechanism for allocating resources and co-ordinating 
economic activities. The following attempts to shed some light into the confusing 
argumentation by grouping the different approaches according to what is explained (the 
explananda)  and  the explaining items (the explanantia).  The theories introduced are 
usually classified as taking a cultural, economic, and evolutionary perspective and can be 
found in China-specific or social science literature. They all claim to provide 
explanations for (Chinese) networks. Yet they differ with respect to the phenomena that 
they want to explain, namely networks and/or the explanatory factors they regard as 
crucial. Thus, for example cultural and economic, better: Transaction cost economics 
(TCE) approaches focus on networks as a given organizational form, while evolutionary 
economics or the capability approach in management science (Teece) include a further 
dimension, namely time, and attempt to explain the process of network development. 
 
The approaches differ also widely according to the factors singled out – or isolated -
which are claimed to be the crucial items in any explanation for networks. To better see 
the contested aspects in these three perspectives, the following distinction is useful. First, 
the question needs to be raised whether the variables quoted in each approach are 
sufficient for explaining, or whether further variables need to be included for getting a 
satisfying explanation. In this case the explanatory power of the original set of variables 
is not questioned. One example would be the claim that familial ties, i.e. the Chinese 
family or family-based villages, can explain the emergence and functioning of networks. 
Related literature would not doubt the importance of the family, or extended family for 
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the formation of networks, yet would point out that the family is only one factor, and that 
in order to get a complete picture, other social groups such as classmates, comrades, i.e. 
members of the CCP need to be included.  
 
Second, the question arises whether the isolated factors are necessary for explaining 
networks. In this case the explanatory power of the variables is questioned. As will be 
seen presently, the Williamson-type of TCE which explains networks by the attempt of 
rational economic actors to economise on TC, disputes that sociodemographic factors 
such as the family, the village, or school are of any value when it comes to explaining 
networks. 
 
The different dimensions of the debate can be sketched as follows 
 
 
Tab. 1 Criticism in the academic discourse on networks 
 N0: Network (t=0) N1: Network (t+1) 
 
 Consequence of 
contest 
 (1) (2)  
     
Sufficiency of 
variables 
Sufficient for 
explaining N0? 
Sufficient for 
explaining N1? 
De-isolation, 
supplementing 
other factors 
    
 (3) (4)  
    
Necessity of 
variables for 
explaining N 
Necessary for 
explaining N0 
Necessary for 
explaining N1 
Replacement of 
factors, new 
approach 
    
 
Source: Maeki 2003 
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A negative response to all 4 questions (1) – (4) prompts a theoretical change. A “no” to 
(1) and (2) asks for including some factors that had been excluded (or were not seen) 
previously. A “no” to (3) and (4) asks for replacement of the isolated factors. The 
different answers to these four questions constitute the crucial element in the academic 
debate on networks in China. As will be seen in what follows, the management studies 
literature, China Studies, and evolutionary economics see question (1) and (2) as the 
prominent ones. The suggestion is therefore to de-isolate the originally chosen factor by 
supplementing them with other factors. The Williamson-type TCE, and partly 
Granovetter’s Embeddedness approach on the other hand will demand a radical move and 
total replacement of the explanatory variables. 
 
 
The Cultural Perspective 
 
The cultural perspective is usually linked to Cultural studies, Cross-cultural studies or to 
literature in China Studies. The following will however also include that part of the 
literature in management studies which claims that networks in China reflect cultural 
preferences1. While in most of the management literature the content of cultural 
preferences remains rather vague, precluding the identifying those factors which will 
determine networks, Hofstede’s (1991) analysis is based on empirical research and 
deserves attention, none the least as he is the most quoted author in this field2. In his 
analysis networks emerge as a result of behavioural codes which are based on norms and 
rules, in particular co-called “Confucianist” values (Hofstede 1991, see also Redding 
1990). Compliance rests on the individual often unscrutinised willingness to follow these 
rules and codes. The approaches have isolated the following dimensions, i.e. variables, 
that shape individual behaviour, more precisely business behaviour, in China: 
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(1) The dimension of collectivism. This refers to fact that Chinese identify with 
small groups for which they feel affinity, or: familial ties, rather than 
identifying with individual choice and individual achievement. 
(2) The dimension of long-term orientation. This refers to the fact that the 
Chinese society, or any small group therein, encourages and rewards future-
oriented behaviour in planning, investment and delaying gratification. 
(3) The dimensions of performance-orientation. This refers to the fact that 
Chinese culture encourages and rewards groups or group members for 
performance and excellence. 
(4) The dimension of power distance. This is referring to the fact, that Chinese 
acknowledge inequality in status and power to the effect that they prefer 
individuals rather than institutions to co-ordinate and supervise action. 
(5) The dimension of reciprocity. While reciprocity in the Western literature 
refers to exchange, i.e. a favour given for a return in the foreseeable future, 
reciprocity in this case determines both the start of personal relations, and the 
co-ordination mechanism employed within groups. Gift-giving at the 
beginning indicates that the boundaries between two people have broken 
down, familial ties (family-like) ties are established so that rule compliance 
becomes a matter of identification and moral obligation (Jacobs, Belschak and 
Krug 2003, Hwang 1987, Yang 1994, 2002). 
 
In short, the collectivist nature of the Chinese prompts them to establish groups, i.e. 
networks, which are not expected to render quick monetary or non-monetary returns 
while individual achievement will be measured in terms of contributing to the status, size, 
and performance of the whole group3. 
 
The problem with this approach is that it cannot explain the emergence of networks 
without falling back on another set of factors, namely social groups which by their nature 
can command loyalty. The family figures prominently in one stream of the China-specific 
management literature and China Studies while other groups, such as groups of people 
having been to school together, or having served together in the army, are assumed to 
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function as “As-if” families4. What these approaches have in common is the assumption 
of  “natural group formation” in Chinese culture. Empirical studies in Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, but also among Overseas Chinese seem to support the assumption when they 
show that, indeed, the family and the three cultural dimensions explain the emergence of 
firms and networks5 (Biggert and Hamilton 1988, Trevor Lacy 1996). This result is not 
surprising if one knows that the analysis relied on data sets from these countries. In other 
words, the selection of what is to be explained predetermines the selection of factor that 
are assumed to be crucial for the explanation. 
 
The cultural perspective faces the criticism of offering an insufficient set of variables 
only. This on conceptual and empirical grounds.  
 
1. If networks were based on certain features that delineate a social group, then 
networks size and member composition would be fixed. The group constitutes the 
pool of potential business partners. In the language of the modern management 
literature: the underlying social group would impose an effective resource 
constraint on networking (Tsang 1998; Pistrui  et.al. 2001; Luo and Chen 1996). 
What we observe, however, is that networks grow out of their original group and 
change membership characteristics. 
2. If networks were based on “natural” groups and behavioural codes demanding 
identification with and loyalty to the networks, then entry to and exit from 
networks would not be a matter of individual choice (Guthrie 1988). The changes 
in size, membership characteristics, or network characteristics do not support this 
assumption. For example our interviews in Zhejiang showed that entrepreneurs 
and managers could be simultaneously member of different networks without 
being exposed to different claims to their loyalty (Krug/Hendrischke 2002b 
INSEAD). In clear contrast to Western style business clubs, let alone a Caste-
system as in India, exit costs are low in China. On the other hand entry-costs are 
high when entry is depending on the introduction by a middleman. If there would 
be an automatism by which a member of a social group becomes a member of a 
network then entry costs would be nil, while exit costs would be considerable. It 
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is worth noticing that the low exit costs is one of the features that distinguishes 
Chinese networks from a Mafia-organisation where exit often enough has to be 
seen literally (Gambetta 1993, Shleifer 1993). 
3. The three Hofstede Dimensions are latent behavioural codes, that need to be 
activated if they determine action. What we observe however, is that that the 
Chinese do not behave according to these codes all the time and in all situations. 
The mobilisation of the codes seems to be rather context-depending. This asks for 
a supplementary theory that can single out structural elements, incentives or 
governance structures that mobilise such a rule-complying behaviour. What is 
also needed is to search for the alternatives that make Chinese acting the way they 
do. The context-dependency of norm-compliance is on one side on the general 
research agenda of social psychologists (McClelland 1985), while our research 
looks into the empirical side, however trying to make use of insights from the 
social psychology as will be summarised  in the last section. 
 
 
These three points emphasize the fact that the family or familial ties despite being crucial 
factors for explaining networks are not the only ones. Even within the literature that takes 
cultural perspective, new factors enter the model. These modified models give a 
contrasting view of networks in so far as networks are now seen as the outcome of 
individual and collective choice. The difference can be briefly summarised as follows: 
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Table 2: Comparison of the two guanxi models 
 
 Model of 
extended family ties 
Model of 
particular instrumental ties 
Relational orientation Sentimental ties Instrumental ties 
Relational base Pseudo-family Any group but mostly one of 
people sharing a “past”.  
Source of guanxi 
capital 
Closeness and sentiments Mutual trust and loyalty 
Social mechanism Fulfilling moral and 
obligations 
Adhering to reciprocity norms 
Source: Jacobs, Belschak, Krug 2003 
 
 
In the familial-ties model networks are the result of group formation according to cultural 
characteristics. The claimed identity between a family and a firm explains the traditional 
Chinese family business, can however not contribute to explaining networks that function 
as business communities, if not Marshall’s industrial districts. For explaining these forms 
the model of particular instrumental ties shows better results as none the least the 
empirical studies of Overseas Chinese firms have shown (Lever-Tracy 1996). It is worth 
mentioning that our research revealed that in the last five years the family business 
became marginalized form, dominating retail, small scale production of goods with low 
technology content and hampered by a severe resource constraint with respect to capital, 
managerial competence and internal labour pool (Hendrischke 2002.). The interviews 
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also showed that Chinese entrepreneurs make use of both “models”, i.e. network forms 
according to the economic problem at hand  (Jacobs, Krug, Belschak 2003). 
 
 
The Transaction Cost perspective 
 
The description starts with the Williamson model. The criticism and suggested 
modification will be summarized afterwards. 
 
The TCE claims that the attributes of economic transactions determine the governance 
structure of collective actors such as firms or networks, or, as a matter of fact, any 
organisation. Organisation can be distinguished by different private property rights 
allocation and different governance structures; they emerge as the result of the different 
attributes of transactions and the need to economize transaction costs (TC). To quote 
Williamson: 
 
“The underlying viewpoint that informs the comparative study of issues of economic 
organization is this: Transaction costs are economized by assigning transactions (which 
differ in their attributes) to governance structures (the adaptive capacities and associated 
costs of which differ) in a discriminating way”. (1985, 18) 
 
While the cultural perspective often uses a typology of social groups that constitute 
familial ties, Williamson also introduces a typology which in his case describes different 
governance structures, such as hierarchy, market, public regulation, public bureaus, and 
hybrids. In his analysis networks would function as a hybrid between market and 
hierarchy (Williamson 1998). 
 
While in the neoclassical world where TC are zero, resources are allocated by the price 
mechanism in (functioning) markets, in the Williamson world, where TC are positive, 
resource allocation depends on the private property rights structure and the prevailing 
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governance structure. The governance structure in turn reflects the need of economic 
agents to cope with bounded rationality and restrict opportunistic behaviour of individual 
agents. The last point is frequently misunderstood. Opportunism in the Williamson world 
refers to strategic behaviour by which economic agents secure their self-interest and 
shows the form of information distortion or “self-disbelieved” promises (Williamson 
1975, 26, 255).  
 
Aside from these behavioural assumptions, the following features of transaction 
determine which governance structure is chosen: asset-specificity, uncertainty, and 
frequency of contacts. All in all, which governance structure is chosen depends on the 
difference in adaptability and differences in TC-structure. By adaptive capability it is 
meant how quickly resources and assets can be moved to another employment, while the 
associated costs refer to the necessary adjustment of asset transfer and operating costs 
(Williamson 1985, 18). 
 
The problem with the Williamson approach is that the alternative governance structures 
are given. To proclaim that there are hybrids, such as networks, that lie somewhere in 
between market co-ordination and hierarchy, leave the phenomenon that one wants to 
explain vague. In order to check whether the factors identified by Williamson are 
sufficient (or necessary) for explaining networks, one needs to be more specific what 
networks are and how they function. This challenge was taken up in the management 
science literature, in sociology, social psychology and New Institutional Economics. 
Their critique will be summarised presently. 
 
First however a short description how TCE would explain networks in China (Krug 2002; 
Krugand Mehta 2003, Qian 2001). It is worth repeating that TCE offers an ex post 
analysis that might claim that networks in China were chosen and became a major 
economic actor because they allow (Krug and Polos 2003) 
 
(1) individual actors pooling resources, such as capital, not (yet) transferable assets, 
individual competence and by doing so enlarge the resource base for (new) firms; 
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(2) allocating resources quickly, thus more flexibly responding to changes in demand, 
supply, relative prices or new business opportunities when compared to the 
hierarchical structure on the socialist planning system; 
(3) allocating resource at lower costs when compared to the “nascent” market 
environment they find themselves in, in particular as with the ill-functioning 
capital market a market for allocating risk is still missing. 
(4) establishing partnership, generating routines, and business practices, such as 
contracting, by defining defaults, monitoring individual behaviour and 
sanctioning misdemeanour. 
 
In TCE economic partners are indifferent to the nature of potential business partners 
while meticulously scrutinising business opportunities, contract compliance, and 
opportunity costs. This is in sharp contrast to the cultural perspective where the potential 
business partner is carefully checked before s/he becomes a member of a network while 
the nature of business deals is less scrutinised. TCE goes far beyond the criticism of the 
cultural perspective heard so far. Socio-demographic factors, such as social groups or 
behavioural codes are regarded as not being necessary for explaining networks. In other 
words, the explanation of networks should be left to economist and some sociologists. 
The criticism falls into the category (3) and (4) in Table 1. Authors having subscribed to 
the cultural perspective, but also Granovetter (1985), stress the missing variables in the 
Williamson concept which can explain neither the emergence of networks nor the 
systematic features in membership composition. 
 
The Williamson concept unleashed new research agendas in the fields of organisation 
theory, New Institutional Economics, strategic management, sociology and social 
psychology, which in turn point to the insufficiencies of TCE. 
 
Enlarging the set of explanatory variables: The critique on TCE 
 
Although TCE admits that transaction cost considerations are not the only factors for 
explaining the organisational choice, other factors such as the “quest for monopoly gains 
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and the imperatives of technology” are assumed to have an impact on “market shares and 
the absolute size of specific technological units…” (Williamson 1981, p. 1537) only. The 
criticism here is that his definition of the phenomena to be explained precludes a broader 
frame of analysis. It is not hard to see, that in the case of networks which according to 
TCE are mainly TC-saving devices, the quest for monopoly gains or technical constraints 
were also dismissed.  
 
And yet, as most research not only on China, but also on other transition economies, in 
particular Russian, have shown, networks are established in order to secure (local) 
monopolies. Our fieldwork for example shows that the attempt to control local 
monopolies is crucial for the evolving private property rights structure, when in order to 
secure a monopoly an alliance between private interests, i.e. investors and managers, and  
public bureaus is needed (Krug and Hendrischke 2002a; for Russia see Shleifer 1993).  
 
The major criticism on TCE however centres on the justified claim, that TCE lacks a 
“…theorizing of the causal mechanism in support for its functional argument” (Dow 
1987, pp. 27-33). The claim that certain governance structures prevail due to the TC-
advantage they offer, can neither explain the emergence of other or new organisational 
forms, such as for example the Chinese networks, nor changes in organisational form 
undertaken by the economic actors themselves. In short, the criticism asks for the 
supplementation of other factors as explanatory variables, and, as will be seen presently, 
for a broader definition of what is to be explained. 
 
In the case that interests here, namely networks, the following aspects deserve attention. 
 
1. The Omission of technology 
To dismiss technology as a major explanatory factor for the chosen organisational 
form was at the core of a major debate that started in the 80s already between TCE, 
traditional organisation theory (Chandler), evolutionary economics (North 1984, 
1994; Jones 1982, 1983) and Williamson (1983a, 1983b). As empirical studies based 
on findings of organisation theory, but also the theory on outsourcing, mergers and 
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acquisition  proved, vertical integration reflects technical interdependencies and their 
changes rather than TC-consideration (Englander 1988). Our interviews for example 
also show that despite the reluctance of networks to embark on long commitments 
such as vertical integration implies, they do invest (in mainly upstream firms) on 
technological grounds. The justification offered that TCEs takes the technical level 
as given, means to make use of the only too familiar ceteris paribus condition and 
limits the explanatory power of the theoretical set up as it precludes to analyse 
changes in organisational forms, or in our case, network development (for another 
view see Podolny, J.M., Stuart T.E. and Hannan MT. 1996). 
 
2. The Omission of power and authority  
In this case the critique, most explicitly by Dow 1987, concentrates on two aspects, 
namely the implicit assumption that specific organisations are neutral with respect to 
the interest of their economic actors, and second that a hierarchical structure, i.e. 
authority, economizes TC by restraining opportunism of subordinate units or 
employees. To start with the former. As the management science and economic 
literature on trust on trust, alliance but also on business communities has shown 
(Nooteboom 1996, 1997) the interests of all actors do matter, as does the strategic 
behaviour of individual members in the production coalition, might this production 
coalition be a firm, a public bureau or a network. TCE focuses on total TC-
advantages while the sharing rules, how the gains from establishing TC-saving 
governance structures are distributed within a network are assumed to play no role.  
 
The development of networks in China point to another picture. It is at this point 
where insights from the cultural perspective re-enter the research agenda. As was 
shown elsewhere (Krug and Mehta 2003, Goodman2003, Duckett 2003) networks 
that are based on an alliance between private investors, or managers on the one side, 
and local government or state bureaus on the other side, take another organisational 
form that networks that link private interests only.  
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That the analysis of hierarchical relations focuses only on the consequences for the 
opportunism of employees or subordinate units is certainly a major deficit of the model. 
As the literature in New Institutional Economics, political science and sociology have 
shown, hierarchy generates a structural condition under which opportunism of employers 
or any head of an organisation is actually encouraged. Hierarchy allows those in power 
using internal information for their benefit, imposing self-serving incentive scheme and 
using fiat to settle disputes to their own advantage (Krug and Hendrischke 2002a). 
 
It is worth mentioning that it is this kind of opportunism, namely opportunism at the top 
that links the analysis of networks to the analysis of corruption (for Russia see Shleifer 
1993).  The contribution of approaches with a cultural perspective can contribute by 
describing the different forms corruption can take,  for example when it is pointed out 
that in Imperial China “squeeze”  operated “through forms of politeness rather than 
secrecy”. (Fairbank/Goldman 1998, p. 182) however without an analysis of the set up of 
economic and political institutions, these description must fail to give conclusive 
explanations. 
 
The debate in economics whether networks contribute to Chinese economic development 
and economic transformation by offering less costly alternatives for allocating resources 
and co-ordinating activities, or whether networks hamper economic development when 
they hinder a quick expansion of markets (use of the price mechanism)  is essentially also 
a debate around “Opportunism at the top”, as market – restricting legislation and state 
interference are negotiated in the political arena (Krug and Hendrischke 2002a). The TCE 
cannot contribute to this debate, while once more insights form a cultural perspective re-
enter the research agenda. 
 
 
 
(3) The Omission of social relations 
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TCE is a striking example for what Granovetter calls the undersocialized concept of 
human action. The TCE-world neglects identity and past relations (Granovetter 1985, p. 
491). The debate it too well known to be repeated here. What matters in the context of 
Chinese networks is the claim of the “Embeddedness approach” that personal relaitons 
and relations between and within firms constitute the primary explanatory items when 
organisational forms are chosen. It is also stated that the level of opportunism in and 
around firms or networks is less the outcome of the governance structure than the 
outcome of personal relations and networks of relations in and around organisations. 
 
In other words, in the embeddedness approach networks do not appear as one amongst 
other organisational forms or governance structures. Instead networks are seen as prime 
movers when it comes to explain other organisational forms, and organisational activities. 
Thus, for example, the analysis argues that stable networks may mediate complex 
transaction, permitting a governance structure of loosely connected subordinate units or 
autonomous firms, co-ordinated by lean management, while lack of personal relations or 
networks that cannot effective control opportunism will force the organisation to 
establish a hierarchical governance structure. 
 
In short the embeddednes approach joins the cultural approaches by emphasizing the role 
of network in the development of a business system while in contrast to these approaches 
transaction cost advantages are not dismissed. 
 
 
(4) The omission of competence and capabilities. 
 
A firm following the neoclassical paradigm where allocative efficiency depends on full 
employment of all resources would hardly survive in the long run. Productive slack is 
needed for innovation, knowledge creation, experimentation, in short: for the building up 
of learning capabilities. The so-called Competence approach (Teece and Pisano 1994, see 
also Hodgson 1998 and Langlois 1992; Langlois and Foss 1999) therefore criticises TCE 
for its failure to contribute to a dynamic view by leaving out factors such as 
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organizational learning and the acquisition of capabilities. A concept of dynamic 
governance costs needs to be developed that attempts to include the costs for generating 
competence as well as transferring capabilities to others if by doing so individual 
performance can be increased (Winter 1991). As is further argued a great part of the 
generation of capabilities depends on the ability to co-operate, share knowledge, and 
creative routines available to all business partners at low costs. In other words, networks 
are a systematic response to the need to maintain competence and capabilities. In the long 
run, the costs for t5ransfering capabilities by networking will be more decisive for the 
level of integrated or loosely connected firms than simple asset-specificity (Langlois 
1992, 124). 
 
In short, the costs for generating, storing, retrieving, and transferring capabilities 
determine when compared to market exchange determine the emergence and size of 
networks, which then ultimately shape the business sector. Once more the criticism 
centres on the insufficiency of variables included in all other models. Some of the 
considerations of the competence approach were used in the model that forms the base of 
the empirical research in China.  
 
The evolutionary perspective 
 
At first sight, evolutionary economics of the Nelson (1995, 1996) or North (1984, 1994) 
version with its focus on selection and changes in relative prices does not seem to be able 
to contribute to the debate on networks. These approaches would claim that the selection 
process driven by (market) competition ultimately determines whether networks will 
survive as a major economic agent in the future Chinese economic system. Such a 
suggestion is open to the functionalist fallacy. When it is claimed that networks must 
offer functional value, otherwise they will disappear, then survivability becomes a proxy 
for functional value. Both features cannot be measured independently. 
 
Organisational ecology (Carroll and Hannan 2000, Hannan and Freeman. 1989) starts 
from another evolutionary perspective when it asks which organisations, such as firms, 
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trade unions, or networks, will survive in the long run. There are two prevailing lines of 
reasoning. Neo-classical economics, at least implicitly, assume that old, large firms due 
to their resource advantage, experience, and  their ability to define standards and thereby 
limit entry, keep young firms at the periphery of the market centre to the effect that a 
firm’s mortality rates drops with increasing age. “The older you are the older you 
become”. Transferring this result to the organisational form that comes closest to firms, 
namely networks, the reasoning would suggest that with increasing age networks will 
occupy the market and political centre, limit entry to newcomers which are kept at the 
periphery (as for example Olson has shown…). Undoubtedly CCP-membership offered a 
safe platform for networking when as it was the case during the Cultural Revolution they 
emerged as a device to secure survival in an environment of social collapse (Yang 1989). 
 
Unsurprisingly one line of argument claims that to the extent that the CCP can co-opt 
new entrepreneurs or entrepreneurial networks, the old organisational form of the Party 
will survive, while new business networks will be kept at the periphery. This after all is 
also the present official Party line. The contesting view is the Schumpeterian “creative 
destruction” (schoepferische Zerstoerung). According to this view old, and large 
organisations due to ossification loose their ability to flexibly respond to changes in the 
environment. Therefore, over the years they get outperformed by new and young 
organisations which eventually will control the market centre and an increasing share of 
resources. 
 
By replacing networks for firms, the China specific interpretation reads as follows. The 
Party is to ossified to respond to changes in the political and economic environment. 
Networks which emerged in big numbers after the reforms started, rapidly moved into the 
market centre and starting in the early nineties when shareholding companies encouraged 
public/private partnerships into the (local) political centre6. By negotiating transfer of  
assets from the state to the private sector these networks increased their resource base 
considerably, while driving state sector and party controlled  economic activities toward 
the periphery. In this case, the “withering away” of the Party-State is the result if 
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different forms of networks with different incentives and capabilities for innovation, 
experimentation, and flexibility. 
 
The next step in taking an evolutionary perspective for modelling networks is then to 
look for features and regularities that are sufficient for predicting change and 
survivability. The literature centres around four assumptions (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels 
1999; Stinchcombe1965; Aldrich 1979; Barron, West, and Hannan 1994): liability of 
newness, liability of smallness, liability of intense competition in the market centre, and 
liability of legitimation. These four assumptions were acknowledged in the design for the 
fieldwork in the last five years. Based on the small data set, a preliminary interpretation 
would look as follows. 
 
At first sight, it looks as if big, state firms in China will dominate the economic sector 
irrespective of ownership due to their broader resource base, and the fact that a broad 
range of input is still state controlled, while the new private firms will be kept at the 
periphery irrespective of economic legislation. And indeed, the confiscation risk, the 
liability of success, and non-tradability of input generates a size distribution similar to the 
one found in Western capitalist economies: the proliferation of numerous small and few 
large (surviving, state owned) organizations with middle scale firms squeezed out, or in 
the Chinese case not emerging. The question, is however whether the large state firms 
will occupy the market centre in the future as in the West. 
 
Our model points to another scenario if ownership and uncertainty is taken into account. 
Uncertainty, often enough accompanied by markets where due to excess demand, almost 
everything sells, makes it empirically hard to define what a market centre is. Even 
without sophisticated tools that help to isolate and define a market centre, firms in China 
are aware the “market moves”. Thus, for example, consumers demand higher quality of 
products, or demand products so far not available in the domestic market, while on the 
other hand, fashion is allowed to play a role. Unlike new private firms, which know that 
their survival depends on producing good for which there is positive demand, state firms 
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facing no competition, have neither the management tools nor the incentive to adjust to 
such an environmental drift7.  
 
On the other hand, private firms have an incentive to remain small as the following 
considerations show. As long as diversification and investment in other sectors or regions 
(by establishing independent new and small companies) is one way to escape over-
taxation or indirect confiscation of profits and cash flow even successful firms have an 
incentive to remain small forgoing scale and scope economies around a core business. To 
invest in other lines of production or other jurisdictions  is to be seen as a response that 
actually exploits the institutional weakness, one that attempts to spread resources across 
different unrelated businesses so that each remains smaller than the threshold at which 
political action can be expected. This tactic explains the rapid growth of relatively small 
companies in the Chinese private business sector. It is worth emphasizing that this feature 
distinguishes Chinese entrepreneurship from European transition economies where large 
foreign or domestic firms set the pace. The large number of (relatively) small companies 
seems to reflect the necessity to safeguard profit and capital accumulation of existing 
firms and preceding entrepreneurship rather than a greater pool of potential entrepreneurs 
as often is argued in cultural explanations. 
 
In other words in contrast to the findings for market economies and what is predicted or 
feared by other approaches we predict the following: Due to uncertainty and (state) 
ownership large firms will be driven to the still (resource rich) periphery while the 
market centre will be occupied by numerous small firm which co-ordinate their action, 
generate capabilities, and establish business practices via networks. 
 
Based on these findings, our empirical research suggest the following support for the 
different approaches:  
 
With respect of what is to be explained: networks can be both substitutes for firms or 
other organisations or a specific organisational form the pre-dates firms and acts as 
collective entrepreneur before firms get started. The kind of collective entrepreneurship 
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that we found in the life history of firms clearly points to personal relations and group 
formation outside the range of (economic) reasoning. This does not mean that these 
groups are not expected to “perform”, it rather stands for the common sense notion that 
economic agents start doing business with people whom they know. And it stands for a 
willingness to co-operate and look for partners. In other words traditional social groups 
offer a kind of scaffolding for the start-up of partnerships and networks. As our empirical 
research indicates, these partnerships become crucial economic agents when membership 
is no longer restricted to individuals but includes firms. What makes the networks behind 
firms so powerful is their function as platform for organisational learning, their control 
over productive slack, their willingness to invest in experiments in production and 
organisational forms, and their ability to define new standards for “doing business”. A 
dynamic analysis would certainly contribute to our understanding of networks, although 
the TCE remains a powerful tool in the short run. Finally, an probably most surprising, 
the Embeddedness Argument by  Granovetter, or the Cultural Persistence-hypothesis by 
di Maggio and Powell (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Powell 1991)) get support by the 
approaches of evolutionary ecology and our field study. One function of networks is to 
render legitimation to new firms and/or new sectors, and new business practices. As long 
as networks concentrate around a geographical base rather than a professional core, we 
would then expect different standards for business relations to emerge, as well as (other 
things equal) investment in different sectors reflecting different “cultural preferences”. 
Once more culture offers the starting point, if culturally chosen institutions or sectors 
should not offer sufficient returns, then they will be given up. In short, as comparative 
business system and New Institutional Economics literature have shown, networks 
“represent enactments of socially acceptable, institutionalised forms of economic 
behavior – they are manifestations of a normative structure that underlies economic 
activity and provides market order” (Orru, Biggart Hamilton  1991, 387). 
. 
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Conclusion 
 
As described previously the debate on networks can be organised by the following 
claims, that 
 
1. Factors isolated in one approach are unnecessary or fruitless for explaining networks; 
2. Factors isolated in one approach though valid, are insufficient for explaining 
networks; 
3. The chosen form of networks is too narrowly defined a subset of the phenomenon that 
needs to be explained. 
 
The claim that one approach uses unnecessary factors is limited to the early TCE, which 
would discard cultural factors in the explanation of networks. Organisational ecology, but 
also Teece, on the other hand insist that networks will change over time so that the 
relevant subset should includes today’s networks and networks at a future date. 
Subsequently, processes and the dynamic of change need to be included in the analysis. 
Evolutionary economics argues that cultural approaches insisting on long term stability of 
values and institutions such as guanxi networks must run into conceptual and empirical 
problems. If as it is the case networks change over time then any attempt to explain short-
term changes with long term stable factors is futile.  
 
Both approaches, organisational ecology and Teece, criticise the TCE’ s comparative 
static analysis in which changes in the environment leads to changes in the governance 
structures as pre-defined in the Williamson typology. Thus, for example, networks might 
give way to a more conventional M-shaped type of firm, or a holding company. For this 
reason networks in TCE remain unexplained. They are rather regarded, if not predicted, 
as transitory phenomena or hybrids only8. 
 
The most dominant form of criticism however is the claim that other approaches need to 
be de-isolated and supplemented with other factors. The social sciences and modern 
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economics (experimental economics and modern HRM) would join cultural studies and 
criticise TVE or traditional economics for not including social preferences. 
 
Tab. 3 Areas of dispute in the academic discourse on networks 
 N0: Network (t=0) N1: Network (t+1) 
 
 New variables 
and approaches 
 (1) (2)  
     
Sufficiency of 
variables 
Cultural factors plus 
economic rationale 
Adaptation vs. 
selection,  
Capabilities 
Social 
preferences,  
dynamic analysis 
    
 (3) (4)  
    
Necessity of 
variables for 
explaining N 
Causal link needs to 
be established 
Process rather than 
choice and response 
to given relative 
prices 
Social psychology,
Experimental 
economics 
    
 
 
It is not hard to see that the notion of social preferences links the literature on guanxi or 
networks to the literature on social capital, cultural capital, trust, norms, or organisational 
forms. For this reason it is worthwhile to finish the paper with a short summary how to 
bridge the dichotomy between cultural explanations and functional explanations. 
 
Social preferences stand for the fact that agents do not only care for the material 
resources allocated to the but also for the material resources allocated to others. While 
economics in the past assumed income (utility-) maximisation as sole motivation, social 
preferences add three other motivations that shape behaviour: reciprocity, social 
approval, and the intrinsic motivation to fulfil a specific task well. Both, reciprocity and 
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social approval are directly linked to network organisations and offer analytical insights 
that cultural studies could exploit for a wider ranging analysis.  
 
For example, the difference between reciprocity, guanxi or moral obligation was already 
described above (Tab. 2). The difference between reciprocity and co-operation as used in 
economics is the following. Economics assumes that actors form networks when and if 
they expect a co-operation rent high enough to cover the costs for co-operating. In other 
words, co-operation depends on expected outcome. In the reciprocity world, on the other 
hand, intention matters. Agents co-operate, better reciprocate when and if a “principal”, 
such as a network displays so-called kind intent. Whether a network is perceived as being 
of kind or hostile intent depends on consequences and the fairness of intent, the latter of 
which referring to the distribution of pay-offs. Experiments have shown that between 40 
and 60 per cent of economic agents consistently respond positively to reciprocity, the rest 
is either behaving selfish or opportunistically. What is not yet done is a systematic 
analysis whether cultural differences in the solid stock of individuals willing to 
reciprocate can be found. Thus, for example, Chinese might use different benchmarks 
when they judge a network as being of “kind intent”, or whether, indeed, the Chinese 
example supports the 40—60 per cent found in other studies. 
 
The link between social approval and cultural studies is the Chinese notion of face while 
the link to economics is the public goods problem. Social approval in this analysis does 
not prompt altruism, but rather conditional co-operation. In the case of networks, 
individual agents will contribute to the network effort provided all others do the same. In 
what is called management of belief networks need to convince their members of their 
effectivity and of their kind intent. This is so, as individual agents will react in a hostile 
way, if they perceive hostile intention of networks. In this setting, identity is crucial for 
employing social approval as motivator. Experiments have shown that the willingness to 
contribute to a joint effort increases significantly when members know each other “by  
face”. Networks offer an organisational form for meeting but no necessarily personally, 
and can therefore provide more public goods, or face less opportunistic behaviour in the 
production of public goods. Once more, systematic empirical research is needed to see 
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whether there are cultural differences between China and other countries, or within 
China. 
 
All in all the comparison of cultural studies, TCE and organisational ecology shows that 
modern economics has moved into the direction of cultural studies acknowledging 
cultural factors as fruitful explanatory variable. This is a move, which also reflects new 
theories in sociology, social psychology, and organisation theory. The old (Weberian?) 
paradigm that assumes cultural and economic analysis to be mutually exclusive seems to 
have lost its persuasive power. 
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1 As for example in Boisot, Max. 1995. Boisot, Max, and J. Child. 1996. Redding, G. 1980, 1990. 
Hamilton and Biggart 1988; Hamilton 1996. 
 
2 With respect to cultural studies and cross-cultural studies see Hofstede (1980, 1991, 1993); Javidan and 
House (2001); House et al. (1999) which developed the Hofstede instrumentarium further.  
 
The most comprehensive analysis of guanxi in China studies is Yang, M.M. 1994. See also Yang, M.M. 
2002; Jacobs, J.B. 1979. Fei, X. 1992; Fried, M.H. 196;. Rozman, G.  2002.  
 
An analysis of guanxi and networks in the management literature can be found for example in Davies, H., 
T.K. Leung, S. Luk, and Y. Wong. 1995; Kao, J. 1993; Kiong T.C. 1991; Kiong, T.C. and Y.P. Kee. 1998. 
Xin, K.R., and J.L. Pearce. 1996; Tsang, W.K. 1998; Yeung, I.Y.M. and R.L. Tung. 1996. Westwood, R.I. 
and J. Everett. 1987.  
 
3 A description from China Studies perspective can be found in Cheng, Y. 1986; Fried, M.H. 1969;  
King, A.Y.C. 1985, 1988.  
 
4 Lin, N. 1989; Wong, S.L. 1985. Fei, X. 1992; Fried, M.H. 1969..Rozman, G.  2002; Yang, M.M. 1994, 
2002. Freedman 1970. 
 
5  Biggert and Hamilton 1988; Trevor Lacy 1996; Feenstra, Huang and Hamilton 1997; Kao 1993. 
 
6 This process is well covered in numerours field studies. See for Example Zhang 2001, the diffeent 
contribution in the book, edited  by Oi and Walder,, ….. 
 
7  Shleifer, A. 1998.  Further empirical evidence can be found in Tan, J. 2002; Lukas, B.A., J.J. Tan, G. 
Thomas and M. Hult. 2001.  
 
8 A similar line of argument is followed by Boisot and Child where the governance structure is shifting 
from”Fief” to “Clan” (Boisot and Chuild 1996). 
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